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Theft, Fraud, and Undue Influence: Determining
the Scope of the Federal Funds Bribery Statute
Derek Tisler†
I. INTRODUCTION
An overarching narrative in American political discourse in 2017
was the prevalent and growing distrust of public institutions. At the
heart of this distrust is a view that public officials act too frequently for
their own benefit rather than for the benefit of their community. When
public officials act in this manner, and law enforcement fails to hold
these agents accountable, people lose confidence in their government’s
ability to provide essential services and to keep their community safe.
This loss of confidence can lead to civic disengagement, allowing further
corruption to take place and, in turn, greater harm to the community.
The television show The Wire explored institutional dysfunction in
urban communities and showcased the detrimental consequences that
follow. When David Simon—the creator of The Wire—was asked
whether he would describe the show as cynical, he responded that the
show was not cynical about individual people, but rather, about “insti-
tutions and their capacity for serving the needs of the individual.”1 Each
season of the show told the story of a different facet of Baltimore and
the public institutions that regularly failed to effectively meet their re-
sponsibilities to these communities. Season One, for example, focused
on the Special Crimes Unit of the Baltimore Police Department and its
efforts to stop illegal drug operations of a local gang. This season con-
veyed an entrenched reality of institutional dysfunction. It showed how
the Police Department avoided oversight and negative consequences for
excessive tactics, and how this failure to hold these actors accountable
† B.A. 2014, Michigan State University; J.D. Candidate 2019, The University of Chicago Law
School. I would like to thank Professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos for his helpful thoughts and feed-
back, as well as the past and present staff and board of The University of Chicago Legal Forum.
1 Jesse Walker, David Simon Says, REASON (Oct. 2004), http://reason.com/archives/2004/10
/01/david-simon-says/ [https://perma.cc/J6QE-KGWU].
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only led to further corruption. In this season and the seasons that fol-
lowed, the show emphasized that the revolting and corrupt activity seen
by the viewer is a direct result of institutional dysfunction. The stories
featured on The Wire helped bring attention to the issue of corruption
in local institutions and demonstrated the need for effective governmen-
tal intervention.
The federal government has taken an increasingly prominent role
in providing for this intervention. In 1984, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C.
§ 666 (“the federal funds bribery statute”),2 providing the federal gov-
ernment clear authority to prosecute general corruption at the state
and local level when federal funds are at issue. The statute was in-
tended to supplement the general bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201,
which only applies to federal employees and other individuals that ex-
ercise federal authority.3 The federal funds bribery statute, on the other
hand, applies to any “agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or
Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof.”4 But the statute is
limited to those governmental or organizational entities that receive at
least $10,000 in funding through a federal program in a one-year pe-
riod.5 This provision recognizes Congress’s interest in ensuring that fed-
eral funds are spent consistently with their intended purposes. The con-
stitutional authority for federal intervention in state and local
corruption rests on this interest.6 The Supreme Court has extended this
constitutional justification even when the exact dollars involved in the
corrupt activity could not be traced back to a federal source.7
Congress enacted the federal funds bribery statute “to protect the
integrity . . . of Federal programs from theft, fraud, and undue influence
by bribery.”8 The statute covers three separate crimes concerning cov-
ered entities (private entities, or state and local governments that re-
ceive federal funds). Section 666(a)(1)(A), covering embezzlement,
makes it a crime for an agent of a covered entity to embezzle or convert
for his own use property valued at $5,000 or more, and owned by the
entity.9 Section 666(a)(1)(B), covering the taking of bribes, makes it a
crime for an agent of a covered entity to solicit or accept “anything of
2 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012).
3 Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution of State and Local Corruption,
92 KY. L. J. 75, 100 (2003).
4 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 603 (2004) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)).
5 18 U.S.C. § 666(b).
6 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 605.
7 Id. at 605–06.
8 S. REP. NO. 98–225, at 370 (1983).
9 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A).
399] THEFT, FRAUD, ANDUNDUE INFLUENCE 401
value” with the intention to be influenced, in connection with a trans-
action “involving anything of value of $5,000 or more.”10 Finally,
§ 666(a)(2), covering the offering of bribes, makes it a crime for any per-
son to corruptly offer or give “anything of value” to an agent of a covered
entity with the intent to influence a transaction “involving anything of
value of $5,000 or more.”11
The bribery crimes under the federal funds bribery statute contain
three separate valuation requirements. First, the “federal funds ele-
ment” limits the statute to entities that receive $10,000 or more in fed-
eral funding during any one-year period.12 Second, the “bribery ele-
ment” requires that the bribe under (a)(1)(B) or (a)(2) be “anything of
value.”13 Finally, the “transactional element” requires that the bribe un-
der (a)(1)(B) or (a)(2) be connected to a transaction “involving anything
of value of $5,000 or more.”14
Embezzlement crimes under (a)(1)(A) require only that the federal
funds element is met and that the property embezzled is valued at
$5,000 or more.15
An example from The Wire illustrates how these valuation require-
ments fit together to determine whether a crime has occurred under the
statute. In the opening scene of Season Two, Episode One, a city police
officer finds a boat that is stranded in the harbor.16 The officer boards
the boat, finds that a party is taking place on the boat, and learns that
the boat is stranded due to engine failure.17 The officer informs the cap-
tain that he will have to tow the boat into shore.18 But the owner of the
boat intervenes and offers the officer a cash bribe to tow the boat “some-
where out of the way [while] the band plays on a while longer.”19 In the
next scene, hours have passed, and the officer is shown sitting in the
police boat with his partner, watching the other boat floating and con-
nected to the tow line as the party continues.20
This scene involved an agent of the city of Baltimore, an entity that
receives well over $10,000 per year in federal funding.21 The federal
10 Id. § 666(a)(1)(B).
11 Id. § 666(a)(2).
12 Id. § 666(b).
13 Id. §§ 666(a)(1)(B), (2).
14 Id. §§ 666(a)(1)(B), (2).
15 Id. §§ 666(a)(1)(A), (b).
16 The Wire: Ebb Tide (HBO television broadcast June 1, 2003) (Season Two, Episode One).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 In 2003, the year this episode of The Wire aired, the City of Baltimore received $250 million
in federal grants. CITY OF BALTIMORE, MARYLAND, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT
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funds element is thus satisfied. Further, the cash transfer was “any-
thing of value,” satisfying the bribery element. Yet the transaction ele-
ment was probably not satisfied. The activity that the bribe was in con-
nection with was the police officers towing the party boat and then
waiting with the boat until the party finished. For the transactional el-
ement to be satisfied, the value of the officer’s time for one night or the
value to the boat owner of the party itself would need to exceed $5,000.
If this transaction was valued at $5,000 or more, a bribery crime would
have been committed under § 666(a)(1)(B) with respect to the police of-
ficer, and under § 666(a)(2) with respect to the boat owner.
Circuits have split on the question of how another part of this stat-
ute, the § 666(c) exception, interacts with these valuation requirements.
Subsection (c)—the “bona fide salary exception”—states that “this sec-
tion does not apply to bona fide salary, wages, fees, or other compensa-
tion paid . . . in the usual course of business.”22 The Sixth and Eleventh
Circuits hold that the bona fide salary exception must be read to apply
to all of the valuation requirements in the statute.23 The Seventh and
Fifth Circuits hold that the bona fide salary exception applies only to
the “wrongdoing”—in the case of bribery, the bribe itself.24
The federal funds bribery statute gives federal law enforcement a
role in prosecuting state and local corruption, providing an alternative
to the state and local law enforcement that may be affected by the cor-
ruption or subjected to greater political pressure. The circuit split over
the interpretation of the bona fide salary exception has implications for
how broad the scope of the federal funds bribery statute will sweep, and
in turn, how much authority federal law enforcement will have in pros-
ecuting state and local matters. When the bona fide salary exception
applies to a valuation requirement, it effectively works to raise that
threshold in particular circumstances. If raising the threshold leads to
the exclusion of non-corrupt transactions, this exclusion may be justi-
fied so as not to overburden and limit acceptable government transac-
tions. But if the interaction of these subsections leads to the exclusion
of corrupt and wrongful transactions, this could lead to an underinclu-
sive application of the statute and frustrate the federal government’s
ability to effectively limit corruption in federally-funded government
services.
18 (June 30, 2003), https://finance.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/FY2003.pdf [https://perma
.cc/5YZV-XMR3].
22 Id. § 666(c).
23 United States v. Mills, 140 F.3d 630, 633 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Chafin, 808 F.3d
1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2015).
24 United States v. Robinson, 663 F.3d 265, 272 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Marmolejo,
89 F.3d 1185, 1190 n.5 (5th Cir. 1996).
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This Comment will argue that “this section,” as used in § 666(c),
refers not to the individual valuation requirements of the section, but
to the wrongdoings described in the section: bribery and embezzlement.
Applying the bona fide salary exception to the bribery and embezzle-
ment elements furthers the federal government’s interest in protecting
the integrity of federal funds. And it does so by focusing federal re-
sources on actions of sufficient severity, without creating arbitrary clas-
ses of corrupt action that escape federal oversight. The bona fide salary
exception therefore separates acceptable transactions from wrongful
ones.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the text and legislative history
of the federal funds bribery statute, as well as the nature of federal
funding programs that give rise to federal intervention. Part III will
assess how federal circuit courts have split over the interpretation of
the bona fide salary exception and the implications of the differing con-
clusions. Finally, in Part IV, this Comment will propose an interpreta-
tion of the statute that both provides a coherent view of the bona fide
salary exception’s relationship with the valuation requirements, and
furthers the policy objectives of Congress to protect federal funds from
theft, fraud, and undue influence.
II. 18 U.S.C. § 666: THE FEDERAL FUNDS BRIBERY STATUTE
A. Text of the Statute
The federal funds bribery statute criminalizes two separate actions
involving agents who work for entities that receive federal funding. The
embezzlement part of the statute makes it a crime for an agent of a
covered entity to “embezzle[], steal[], obtain[] by fraud, or otherwise . . .
convert to use” money or property that is owned by the entity.25 The
bribery part of the statute addresses bribery of entity agents in connec-
tion with transactions of the entity.26 The agent that solicits or accepts
the bribe is covered under (a)(1)(B) and the individual who offers or
gives the bribe is covered under (a)(2).
The embezzlement crime contains two valuation requirements.
First, the “federal funds element” in subsection (b) limits the statute to
entities that receive $10,000 or more in federal funding during any one-
year period.27 Second, the “embezzlement element” requires that the
value of the property that is “embezzle[d], [stolen], obtain[ed] by fraud,
or otherwise without authority knowingly convert[ed] to the use of any
25 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A).
26 Id. §§ 666(a)(1)(B), (2).
27 Id. § 666(b).
404 THEUNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2018
person other than the rightful owner”must be “$5,000 or more.”28 Thus,
in order to meet the requirements of an embezzlement crime under the
statute, an agent of a government or organization that receives at least
$10,000 in a one-year period must embezzle property, owned by that
entity, that has a value of $5,000 or more.
The bribery crimes contain three valuation requirements. First, the
“federal funds element” in subsection (b) limits the statute to entities
that receive $10,000 or more in federal funding in any one-year period.29
Second, the “bribery element” requires that the bribe under (a)(1)(B) or
(a)(2) must be “anything of value.”30 Finally, the “transactional ele-
ment” requires that the bribe under (a)(1)(B) or (a)(2) be connected to a
transaction “involving anything of value of $5,000 or more.”31 Thus, in
order to meet the requirements of a bribery crime under the statute, (1)
the bribe must go to an agent of an organization that receives at least
$10,000 in a one-year period, (2) the bribe to the agent must be of value,
and (3) the bribe must be intended to influence a transaction that has
a value of at least $5,000.
Subsection (c), commonly referred to as the “bona fide salary excep-
tion,” provides that “this section does not apply to bona fide salary,
wages, fees, or other compensation paid, or expenses paid or reim-
bursed, in the usual course of business.”32 Since the bona fide salary
exception refers to transactions of financial value, the most reasonable
reading of the statute is that the exception is meant to have an impact
on at least some of the valuation requirements. But there is disagree-
ment among courts as to exactly which elements within “this section”
(§ 666) the exception applies to, as well as what effect this application
has on the elements. This disagreement is the focus of this Comment.
B. Legislative History
Before the federal funds bribery statute was enacted, 18 U.S.C.
§ 201 operated as the only general bribery statute in the federal crimi-
nal code.33 Section 201 applies to “public officials,” defined as “an officer
or employee, or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or
any department, agency or branch of Government thereof, including the
District of Columbia, in any official function, under or by authority of
any such department, agency, or branch.”34 At the time Congress was
28 Id. § 666(a)(1)(A).
29 Id. § 666(b).
30 Id. §§ 666(a)(1)(B), (2).
31 Id. §§ 666(a)(1)(B), (2).
32 Id. § 666(c).
33 Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 58 (1997).
34 18 U.S.C. § 201(a).
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considering the federal funds bribery statute, there was a case pending
before the Supreme Court,35 which was to resolve the circuit split over
whether state and local employees could be “public officials” under
§ 201(a).36 Congress specifically noted this ambiguity and, as a response
to the pending case, passed the federal funds bribery statute in part to
provide clear authority to prosecute bribery for state and local govern-
ment employees in connection with federal funds.37
The stated purpose of the federal funds bribery statute, according
to a Senate Judiciary Committee Report, is to “augment the ability of
the United States to vindicate significant acts of theft, fraud, and brib-
ery involving Federal monies which are disbursed to private organiza-
tions or State and local governments pursuant to a Federal program.”38
The report further stated that the Committee intended the scope of
what is considered a “Federal program” under subsection (b) to be “con-
strued broadly, consistent with the purpose of this section to protect the
integrity of the vast sums of money distributed through federal pro-
grams from theft, fraud, and undue influence by bribery.”39 However,
the report noted that “the concept is not unlimited,” and that “there
must exist a specific statutory scheme authorizing the federal assis-
tance” in order to fall within the purview of the statute.40 The report
listed three previous cases—which were part of the circuit split over the
meaning of § 201—as examples of circumstances in which the federal
funds bribery statute was meant to apply.41
The original version of the statute, enacted in 1984, did not contain
a bona fide salary exception.42 That part was added with an amendment
in 1986,43 which also changed the wording and structure of the statute
“to conform [the statute] to the drafting style and format used generally
in Title 18 of the United States Code.”44 A House Committee report
notes that the statute was amended “to avoid its possible application to
35 Dixon v. United States, 465 U.S. 482 (1984).
36 Salinas, 522 U.S. at 58; see also Justin Weitz, The Devil is in the Details: 18 U.S.C. § 666
after Skilling v. United States, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 805, 816 (2011).
37 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 369 (1983); see also Salinas, 522 U.S. at 58; Weitz, supra note 36, at
816.
38 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 369; see also George D. Brown, Stealth Statute—Corruption, the
Spending Power, and the Rise of 18 U.S.C. § 666, 73 NOTREDAME L. REV. 247, 277 (1998).
39 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 369. This broad interpretation of “federal program” has been sup-
ported by the Supreme Court. See Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 678 (2000).
40 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 369.
41 Id.
42 Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1104, 98 Stat. 1837, 2143 (1984).
43 Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 59, 100 Stat. 3592, 3612 (1986).
44 H.R. REP. NO. 99-797, at 30 (1986).
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acceptable commercial and business practices.”45 A footnote further ex-
plains that the statute “prohibits bribery of certain public officials, but
does not seek to constrain lawful commercial business transactions.”46
The footnote also states that the bona fide salary exception “parallels
the bank bribery provision (18 U.S.C. 215).”47
In Sabri v. United States,48 the Supreme Court unanimously up-
held the constitutionality of the federal funds bribery statute.49 The
Court explained that:
Congress has authority under the Spending Clause to appropri-
ate federal moneys to promote the general welfare, Art. I, § 8, cl.
1, and it has corresponding authority under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, to see to it that taxpayer dollars
appropriated under that power are in fact spent for the general
welfare, and not frittered away in graft or on projects under-
mined when funds are siphoned off or corrupt public officers are
derelict about demanding value for dollars.50
The Court further noted that, even when the bribe is not directly from
or connected to federal payments, “[m]oney is fungible, bribed officials
are untrustworthy stewards of federal funds, and corrupt contractors
do not deliver dollar-for-dollar value.”51
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE BONA FIDE SALARY EXCEPTION
Circuits have split over how the bona fide salary exception inter-
acts with the valuation requirements contained in the statute. The ex-
ception states that “this section does not apply to bona fide salary,
wages, fees, or other compensation paid . . . in the usual course of busi-
ness.”52 The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits hold that the bona fide salary
exception must be read to apply to all of § 666.53 The Seventh and Fifth
Circuits hold that the bona fide salary exception applies only to the
“wrongdoing”—the bribe itself.54 The circuit split over the interpreta-
tion of the bona fide salary exception has implications for how broadly
45 Id.
46 Id. at 30 n.9.
47 Id.
48 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
49 Id. at 602.
50 Id. at 604.
51 Id. at 606.
52 18 U.S.C. § 666(c).
53 United States v. Mills, 140 F.3d 630, 633 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Chafin, 808 F.3d
1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2015).
54 United States v. Robinson, 663 F.3d 265, 272 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Marmolejo,
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the scope of the statute sweeps, and in turn, howmuch authority federal
law enforcement will have in prosecuting state and local matters.
A. The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits: The Bona Fide Salary Exception
Applies to Each Valuation Requirement
The Sixth Circuit holds that the bona fide salary exception must be
read to apply to all of § 666.55 In United States v. Mills,56 the govern-
ment alleged that the Chief Deputy Sheriff and a staff special deputy
at a county sheriff’s department violated the statute when they solicited
and obtained payments from individuals in exchange for a promise to
hire these individuals as deputy sheriffs.57 The payments obtained were
between $3,500 and $3,930.58 The district court ruled “that the conduct
charged by the government did not constitute a violation of [the statute]
because the minimum transaction valuation required by the statute
had not been met under the facts of [the] case.”59 The bribes to the of-
ficers were “anything of value,” but the bribes did not influence a trans-
action valued at $5,000 or more because the court read the bona fide
salary exception to exclude the value of the deputy sheriff position sal-
aries from the calculation of the transaction.60
The government argued that the bona fide salary exception only
applies to the bribery element (“i.e., whether the local government
agent solicited or accepted ‘anything of value’”) and not to the transac-
tional element (“i.e., whether the transaction in connection with which
a bribe was received involved ‘anything of value of $5,000 or more’”).61
The Sixth Circuit court, however, sided with the defendant and con-
cluded that the bona fide salary exception “must be read to apply to all
of § 666. . . .”62
The Sixth Circuit reached this conclusion by determining that “this
section” in subsection (c), unambiguously meant the whole section (i.e.,
18 U.S.C. § 666).63 In so doing, the court noted that “broad language
referring to the entire body of the law was used” and that Congress
89 F.3d 1185, 1190 n.5 (5th Cir. 1996).
55 Mills, 140 F.3d at 633.
56 Id. at 630.
57 Id. at 631.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 633.
61 Id. at 632.
62 Id. at 633.
63 Id. at 633.
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could have used more restrictive language if it wished to limit the ex-
ception to the bribe only.64 The court explained that by adding the ex-
ception, Congress demonstrated an intention for only the most serious
instances of corruption to fall under the federal act.65 Because the bona
fide salary exception applies to all of § 666, the salaries to be paid to the
individuals as deputy sheriffs could not be included in calculating
whether the bribe was connected to a transaction involving anything of
value of $5,000 or more. In other words, the value of the bribe itself
could be calculated as part of the transactional element ($3,500 to
$3,930 in each transaction), but the benefit received by the individuals
that paid the bribe (a deputy sheriff salary) could not be included in the
sum. Thus, the transactional element for each bribery count was only
$3,500 to $3,930, falling below the required threshold of $5,000.66
The Eleventh Circuit agrees with the Sixth Circuit that the bona
fide salary exception applies to the whole statute.67 In United States v.
Chafin,68 the government alleged that a county sheriff committed fed-
eral-program embezzlement under the statute when he drew, made
payable, and cashed 225 checks totaling $65,730 from the jail commis-
sary account over a two-year period.69 The county where he worked had
received $33,897 in federal funds during each of the two years that this
activity was taking place.70 The federal funds received were disbursed
under the Victims of Crimes Act.71 At least $25,000 of these federal
funds were used each year to pay the salary of a witness advocate.72
Thus, the defendant argued that the federal funds requirement was not
met, because these “bona fide” salary payments could not be included
in determining the federal funds received under subsection (b).73
The court agreed with the defendant that the bona fide salary ex-
ception applies to the whole act, including the federal funds element,
but affirmed his conviction on other grounds.74 The court followed the
reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in determining that the phrase “this sec-
tion” in § 666(c) is unambiguous and “that the statutory scheme is con-
sistent and coherent.”75
64 Id.
65 Id. at 632.
66 Id. at 633.
67 United States v. Chafin, 808 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2015).
68 808 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2015).
69 Id. at 1266.
70 Id. at 1267.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1268.
74 Id. at 1272–73.
75 Id. at 1271.
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B. The Seventh and Fifth Circuits: The Bona Fide Salary Exception
Applies Only to the Bribery Element
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, holds that the bona fide
salary exception applies only to the bribery element of the statute.76 In
United States v. Robinson,77 Anthony Robinson was charged with fed-
eral-funds bribery under the statute when he allegedly bribed a police
officer.78 Robinson was suspected of running a cocaine-trafficking oper-
ation and had attempted to bribe a police officer during a traffic stop.79
The officer initially refused, but later set up a sting operation and solic-
ited a bribe from Robinson.80 Robinson offered to pay the officer $1,000
per week to “get the heat off” of him, but he ended up paying the officer
“only about $1,000” in total.81 The officer later agreed with Robinson to
sell him seized cocaine and arrested Robinson when the transaction oc-
curred.82
Robinson appealed his conviction in part because he argued that
the transactional element had not been met. The government argued
that Robinson’s bribe was “intended to influence [the officer] in connec-
tion with the [police department]’s ‘business’ of investigating drug traf-
ficking.”83 As such, the transactional element would be met if this busi-
ness of investigating drug trafficking had a value of $5,000 or more. The
government argued that the value of this business did exceed $5,000 by
any of three metrics: “(1) the officers’ salaries (well over $5,000); (2) the
amount of the bribe (an open-ended offer of $1,000 per week); or (3) the
estimated value of an illicit ‘license’ to sell cocaine (well over $5,000 in
ill-gotten gains).”84 In a challenge to the first possible metric, the appel-
lant argued that the officer’s salary could not be used to establish the
transactional element minimum because of the bona fide salary excep-
tion.85
The court rejected the appellant’s argument, holding that the lan-
guage “[t]his section does not apply,” as used in the bona fide salary
exception “suggests only that legitimate salary, wages, and other com-
pensation may not be considered a bribe, not that salary evidence may
not be admitted to prove the value of the ‘business’ or ‘transaction’ the
76 United States v. Robinson, 663 F.3d 265, 272 (7th Cir. 2011).
77 663 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 2011).
78 Id. at 266.
79 Id. at 267.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 272.
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bribe-giver or bribe-taker intended to influence.”86 The court noted that
the reasoning in Mills was not consistent with the statutory text,
“which uses the language of an exception, not the language of a limita-
tion on the proofs.”87 The bona fide salary exception “pertains to the
alleged wrongdoing—that is, the bribe itself—and does not limit the
modes of proof for the $5,000 minimum-value requirement in the trans-
actional element of the offense.”88
The Fifth Circuit has also noted that the bona fide salary exception
applies only to the alleged wrongdoing in the case.89 In United States v.
Marmolejo,90 the court considered an appeal from a federal-programs
bribery conviction “arising from a series of bribes [accepted by a Sher-
iff], in exchange for permitting conjugal visits for a federal prisoner
housed at [the county jail].”91 In a footnote, the court addressed the de-
fendants’ argument that the federal payments used to establish the fed-
eral funds requirement constituted a “commercial transaction,” that
was excluded from the statute by the bona fide salary exception.92 The
court explained, however, that the bona fide salary exception “refers to
the alleged wrongdoing . . . not to the nature of the benefit that the
agency receives pursuant to the Federal program.”93 Thus, the court ar-
gued, all of the federal funds received by the county could be counted
toward the federal funds requirement, regardless of whether the funds
were part of a commercial transaction.
C. The Supreme Court’s Discussion of the Bona Fide Salary Excep-
tion
The Supreme Court discussed the impact of the bona fide salary
exception in dicta in Fischer v. United States,94 which considered
whether hospitals that participate in the Medicare program are covered
entities that receive “benefits” under the federal funds requirement of
§ 666(b). In this case, the appellant argued that the exception “operates
to exclude [the Medicare payments] because they are either ‘compensa-
tion’ or ‘expenses paid or reimbursed,’ or some combination of the two,
and that the payments are made in the ‘usual course of business.’”95 The
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1190 n.5 (5th Cir. 1996).
90 89 F.3d 1185 (5th Cir. 1996).
91 Id. at 1188.
92 Id. at 1190 n.5.
93 Id.
94 529 U.S. 667 (2000).
95 Id. at 678.
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Court noted that one inference of the exception “is that the described
payments would have been benefits but for the [the exception].”96 How-
ever, the Court stated that it “need not go so far” because, “[e]ven as-
suming the examples of [the exception] bear upon the definition of ben-
efits,” the Medicare payments in question “are made for significant and
substantial reasons in addition to compensation or reimbursement” and
thus beyond the scope of the exception.97 The Court further explained
that “[t]o determine whether an organization participating in a federal
assistance program receives ‘benefits’ [under § 666(b)], an examination
must be undertaken of the program’s structure, operation, and pur-
pose.”98
Of the circuit courts that have determined which valuation require-
ments the bona fide salary exception applies to, only the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Robinson and the Eleventh Circuit in Chafin addressed the issue
after the Supreme Court’s discussion in Fischer. The Eleventh Circuit
confirmed that the Supreme Court’s in arguendo exploration of the bona
fide salary exception was mere dicta by treating the issue as a matter
of first impression.99 Further, the two circuit courts came to different
conclusions on the matter and neither court cited Fischer in reaching
its decision.100
D. Effect of the Circuit Split on Federal Jurisdiction under the Fed-
eral Funds Bribery Statute
The conflict among circuit courts over how to interpret the bona
fide salary exception has implications for how broad the scope of the
statute will sweep, and in turn, how much authority federal law en-
forcement will have in prosecuting state and local matters. Given the
history and purpose of the statute, it is reasonable to read the minimum
thresholds set by the valuation requirements as limiting the statute to
corrupt transactions of sufficient enough severity that they merit the
attention of limited federal resources.101 Under this reading, the embez-
zlement element provides that more minor embezzlement actions in
96 Id.
97 Id. at 679.
98 Id. at 681.
99 United States v. Chafin, 808 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2015).
100 Fischer was cited in Chafin only for the idea that the broad purpose of § 666 is ensuring
“the integrity of organizations participating in federal assistance programs.” Id. at 1272.
101 See, e.g., United States v. Sabri, 326 F.3d 937, 952 (8th Cir. 2003) (The $10,000 [federal
funds] threshold requirement and the $5,000 transactional requirement create a sufficient nexus
between the offense conduct and federal funds to ensure that federal power will not be extended
to the prosecution of merely local matters that may not jeopardize in any significant manner the
integrity of federal funds.); United States v. Ferrara, 990 F.Supp. 146, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[A]
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covered entities do not merit federal attention and therefore can be han-
dled through state and local law enforcement at the discretion of the
state. The bribery element uses the language of “anything of value,” in-
dicating that any bribe can be worthy of federal attention depending on
the outcome sought to be influenced by the bribe. This outcome is meas-
ured by the transactional element, which states that the outcome, in
connection with the bribe, must be valued at $5,000 or more to merit
federal attention. Finally, since the federal interest in the matters of
these entities is established through federal funding, the federal funds
element sets a threshold of $10,000 in any one-year period.
The bona fide salary exception, when applied to a valuation re-
quirement, effectively works to raise that threshold in particular cir-
cumstances. For example, if the bona fide salary exception applies to
the embezzlement element, the value of property that is converted to
the use of a person other than the rightful owner must be worth at least
$5,000, excluding all bona fide salary, wages, fees, or other compensa-
tion paid, or expenses paid or reimbursed, in the usual course of busi-
ness. Similarly, if the exception is applied to the transactional element,
the bribe must be in connection with a transaction valued at $5,000 or
more without considering any expenses paid in the usual course of busi-
ness that are part of the particular transaction. As the number of re-
quirements subject to the bona fide salary exception increases, the num-
ber of transactions involving government agents or resources that are
subject to criminal liability under the statute decreases. If the interac-
tion of these subsections leads only to the exclusion of acceptable, non-
corrupt transactions, this exclusion would be strongly justified so as not
to overburden and limit acceptable government transactions. However,
if the interaction of these subsections leads to the exclusion of wrongful,
corrupt transactions, this could hinder the federal government’s ability
to protect the integrity of federal funding at the state and local level.
IV. THE BONA FIDE SALARY EXCEPTION CLARIFIES THEWRONGDOINGS
COVERED BY THE FEDERAL FUNDS BRIBERY STATUTE
Courts that have examined the question of which valuation re-
quirements the bona fide salary exception applies to have done so with
a narrow scope and in the context of case-specific facts. In Chafin, for
example, the court looked at an alleged embezzlement crime where only
plain reading of the statute seems to indicate that the purpose of the $5,000 [transactional] re-
quirement is to assure that only corrupt transactions which may be categorized as significant—as
measured against that dollar amount—will activate Section 666.”); United States v. Apple, 927 F.
Supp. 1119, 1125 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (“Congress wanted to limit the reach of section 666 to circum-
stances where, in some way, the bribe involves ‘real money’ and thereby a real threat to the ulti-
mate integrity of appreciable federal funds.”).
399] THEFT, FRAUD, ANDUNDUE INFLUENCE 413
the federal funds element was challenged.102 The court held that the
bona fide salary exception applied to the whole section in the context of
this narrow challenge, but it never considered the implications of this
holding with respect to the transactional element. Likewise, the court
in Robinson held that the bona fide salary exception applied only to the
bribery element without considering whether the same logic used to
support this decision would compel a similar application to the embez-
zlement requirement.103 This unresolved question is ripe for a broad ex-
amination of the entirety of the statute, and a solution that is consistent
with the structure, purpose, and history of the statute as a whole.
The valuation requirements fit into two general categories. Two of
the requirements—the embezzlement element and the bribery ele-
ment—determine whether a wrongdoing occurred. These elements rep-
resent the actions that the statute seeks to prohibit. The embezzlement
element is the defining element of the embezzlement crime, which seeks
to stop the flow of corrupt money from government officials to wrongful
beneficiaries. The bribery element is the defining element of the bribery
crime, which seeks to stop the flow of corrupt money to government of-
ficials. The other two requirements—the transactional element and the
federal funds element—describe the circumstances surrounding the
wrongdoing and the effect of the wrongdoing. The transactional element
describes the severity of the wrongdoing by measuring the benefit
sought by the briber. The federal funds element describes the federal
interest in preventing the wrongdoing by measuring the investment by
the federal government in the covered entity.
The bona fide salary exception seeks to distinguish exchanges that
are prohibited under the statute from exchanges that are acceptable.
The exception can be read as stating that “bona fide salary, wages, fees,
or other compensation paid, or expenses paid or reimbursed, in the
usual course of business” is not embezzlement or bribery under the stat-
ute. However, the enumerated categories in the exception do not bear
any relation to the severity of the wrongdoing or the federal govern-
ment’s interest in the wrongdoing. This marks a logical line of where
the bona fide salary exception applies. The bona fide salary exception is
applicable to the embezzlement element and the bribery element, but
not to the transactional element or the federal funds element. The ex-
ception is meant to ensure that when money goes to or from an official
of a covered entity, the transaction is not a crime if this transfer is part
of a legitimate commercial transaction. The bona fide salary exception
implements and reinforces the line between acceptable and wrongful
transactions.
102 Chafin, 808 F.3d at 1270.
103 United States v. Robinson, 663 F.3d 265, 272 (7th Cir. 2011).
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A. The Bona Fide Salary Exception
The bona fide salary exception ensures that the statute “does not
apply to bona fide salary, wages, fees, or other compensation paid, or
expenses paid or reimbursed, in the usual course of business.”104 The
ordinary meaning of “bona fide” is “made in good faith without fraud or
deceit,” as exemplified by dictionary definitions at the time that the
bona fide salary exception was added to the statute.105 As previously
mentioned, the stated purpose of the bona fide salary exception is “to
avoid [the section’s] possible application to acceptable commercial and
business practices.”106 Acceptable commercial and business practices
can be read to mean transactions that are made in good faith and with-
out fraud or deceit, such as salary paid to an employee, fees paid to a
governmental entity, and government contracts with private parties.
This exception, therefore, excludes the value of ordinary commercial
transactions made in good faith when calculating whether an applicable
valuation requirement is met.
Courts that have read the bona fide salary exception to apply to
each valuation requirement have latched onto the phrase “this section”
and have determined that this unambiguously means that this section
must be read to apply to every valuation element that is contained
within “this section”— all of § 666.107 But determining that “this sec-
tion” applies to all of § 666 (rather than only a particular subsection)
can be consistent with two readings. One interpretation is that the bona
fide salary exception applies to each valuation requirement within “this
section.” Another interpretation is that the bona fide salary exception
applies to the wrongdoings described in “this section.” The courts in
Robinson108 andMarmolejo109 advocated for this latter approach.
The legislative history of the statute, and the bona fide salary ex-
ception in particular, is consistent with the second way of reading “this
section.” The House Judiciary Committee report that accompanied the
104 18 U.S.C. § 666(c).
105 See United States v. Walsh, 156 F. Supp. 3d 374, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (discussing the defi-
nition of “bona fide” in various dictionaries from 1985 to 2014). The other definitions cited inWalsh
were all a close variation of “made in good faith without fraud or deceit.” See also United States v.
George, 841 F.3d 55, 62 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[C]onsistent with the plain language and evident purpose
of the statute . . . ‘bona fide salary’ means salary actually earned in good faith for work done for
the employer”); United States v. Williams, 507 F.3d 905, 908 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[S]alary is not bona
fide or earned in the usual course of business under § 666(c) if the employee is not entitled to the
money.”).
106 H.R. REP. NO. 99-797, at 30 (1986).
107 United States v. Chafin, 808 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Mills, 140
F.3d 630, 633 (6th Cir. 1998).
108 Robinson, 663 F.3d at 272.
109 United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1190 n.5 (5th Cir. 1996).
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1986 Amendment, which added the bona fide salary exception, stated
that the statute was amended “to avoid its possible application to ac-
ceptable commercial and business practices.”110 A footnote further ex-
plained that the statute “prohibits bribery of certain public officials, but
does not seek to constrain lawful commercial business transactions.”111
The statute thus “prohibits corruptly giving or receiving anything of
value for the purpose of influencing or being influenced in connection
with any business, transaction, or series of transactions.”112 These com-
ments demonstrate an understanding that the bona fide salary excep-
tion would apply to the wrongdoing—specifically bribery—though the
reasoning would compel application to embezzlement as well. But these
comments indicate that Congress did not consider potential application
to the transactional or federal funds element.
Moreover, the House Judiciary Committee Report stated that the
bona fide salary exception “parallels the bank bribery provision (18
U.S.C. 215).”113 Section 215, in relevant part, states that:114
(a) Whoever—
(1) corruptly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to
any person, with intent to influence or reward an officer, di-
rector, employee, agent, or attorney of a financial institution
in connection with any business or transaction of such insti-
tution; or
(2) as an officer, director, employee, agent, or attorney of a
financial institution, corruptly solicits or demands for the
benefit of any person, or corruptly accepts or agrees to accept,
anything of value from any person, intending to be influ-
enced or rewarded in connection with any business or trans-
action of such institution;
shall be fined not more than $5,000 . . .
Section 215 also contains a bona fide salary exception115:
110 H.R. REP. NO. 99-797, at 30.
111 Id. at 30 n.9.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 18 U.S.C. § 215(a).
115 Id. § 215(c).
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(c) This section shall not apply to bona fide salary, wages, fees,
or other compensation paid, or expenses paid or reimbursed, in
the usual course of business.
However, the bank bribery provision contains no valuation require-
ments beyond the bribery element: the statute only contemplates a brib-
ery crime; the bribe need only be connected to “any business or transac-
tion of such institution” regardless of value; and there is obviously no
federal funds element since the statute applies to private banks. The
bona fide salary exception language was added to the bank bribery stat-
ute in the same year that the bona fide salary exception language was
added to the federal funds bribery statute.116
The decision by Congress to explicitly use this same language in
the federal funds bribery statute is consistent with the idea that Con-
gress did not intend for the bona fide salary exception to narrow the
transactional or federal funds elements. Under the in pari materia
canon, statutes that “share a common subject matter, employ similar
language, or directly refer to one another” are interpreted in a manner
that allows for inter-statutory consistency and coherence.117 The argu-
ment for reading the federal funds bribery statute and the bank bribery
statute in pari materia is especially strong in this case because: the two
provisions address a common subject matter (corrupt transactions); the
two provisions employ identical language; and the provisions were en-
acted by the same Congress. In combination with the legislative history,
this inter-statutory reading strongly suggests that the meaning of the
bona fide salary exceptions in both § 666(c) and § 215(c) is that “bona
fide salary, wages, fees, or other compensation paid . . . in the usual
course of business” is not a wrongdoing covered by the statute.118
B. The Bribery Element
The application of the bona fide salary exception to the bribery el-
ement is the most obvious and coherent application. All of the courts
that have examined the question at issue here have concluded that the
exception applies to the bribery element, such that bona fide compensa-
tion paid in the usual course of business cannot be included in deter-
mining whether there was “anything of value” involved in the bribe.
Applied to the bribery element, the bona fide salary exception carries a
clear purpose: to make sure that legitimate wages, compensation, and
116 Pub. L. No. 99-370, § 2, 100 Stat. 779 (1986); Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 59, 100 Stat. 3592, 3612
(1986).
117 William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 171, 222 (2000).
118 18 U.S.C. § 666(c); 18 U.S.C. § 215(c).
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business transactions are not considered a bribe. When a government
official hires an employee, or a concert venue contracts with the local
police to provide security near the event, such payments are made “with
an intent to influence or reward” a government official. Yet such trans-
actions are not the target of the statute and are not actions that would
ordinarily merit criminal liability. These transactions do not negatively
impact the integrity of federal funds or divert federal funds to unin-
tended purposes. As such, the bona fide salary exception removes these
expenses “paid in the usual course of business” from the scope of the
statute. If, however, the salary was influenced by a bribe—for example
if an individual paid a government official a bribe in exchange for being
hired as an employee—the bona fide salary exception would not pre-
clude liability. In such a case, the salary would serve as the transac-
tional element and, as argued below, would not be excluded from the
calculation of this element.
Application of the bona fide salary exception to the bribery element
has a clear meaning and purpose within the organization of the statute.
Bona fide compensation in the usual course of business is a subset in
the general category of benefits given to, or accepted by, government
agents in order to influence government business or transactions; it is
important to distinguish this subset from other actions that negatively
impact the integrity of federal funds. The bona fide salary exception
thus effectively separates acceptable transactions from wrongful trans-
actions. The exception also gives meaning to “corruptly,” as used in the
statute, by clarifying the instances in which giving anything of value,
with the intent to influence, is not corrupt.
Application of the bona fide salary exception to the bribery element
also creates consistency across federal bribery statutes. The federal
funds bribery statute can be read as having the same meaning with
respect to the surrounding statute as identical language that was added
to another federal bribery statute earlier in the year; that is, the bona
fide salary exception can be read as a subsection meant to further define
what a bribe is.
C. The Embezzlement Element
Of the cases that make up the circuit split, only the Eleventh Cir-
cuit examined the question in the context of an embezzlement crime.
The court’s holding—that the bona fide salary exception applies to the
whole section, including the federal funds element—was made in the
context of considering a challenge to the government’s ability to prove
that the federal funds threshold was met. The opinion therefore offers
no analysis with specific respect to the embezzlement element beyond
the overall view that “the plain meaning of the phrase this section [does
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not warrant] applying subsection (c)’s exception to only certain parts of
§ 666.”119
The embezzlement element is, in a sense, the mirror of the bribery
element. The embezzlement element defines the crime that seeks to
stop the flow of corrupt money from government officials to wrongful
beneficiaries. The bribery element defines the crime that seeks to stop
the flow of corrupt money to government officials, who are attempting
to gain a wrongful benefit. Each of the elements determine whether an
action has occurred that threatens the integrity of federal funds.
The same reasons that support application of the bona fide salary
exception to the bribery element compel application to the embezzle-
ment element. Just like the bribery element, application of the bona fide
salary requirement to the embezzlement element has a clear meaning
and purpose within the organization of the statute. When a local gov-
ernment hires a contractor to complete a road project, a government
official converts property under the control of the government to the use
of another. But these transactions do not negatively impact the integ-
rity of federal funds or divert federal funds to unintended purposes.
Conversely, if a government employee diverted into his own bank ac-
count salary that was supposed to be paid to a coworker, this transac-
tion clearly frustrates the integrity of federal funds. The bona fide sal-
ary exception would not exclude such funds even though they are
“salary,” because such funds are not paid in the usual course of busi-
ness; that is, the funds are not paid to the intended employee in ex-
change for services rendered. Bona fide compensation in the usual
course of business is a subset within the general category of property
under the control of government that is converted to the use of another;
it is important to distinguish this subset from other actions that nega-
tively impact the integrity of federal funds. The bona fide salary excep-
tion removes this subset of a general category from the scope of criminal
liability.
One could argue that the language surrounding the embezzlement
element does not contain a broad word similar to “corruptly” that needs
to be clarified through a later exception. Compared to “corruptly,” the
meaning of “without authority” is relatively clear. However, both legit-
imate and illegitimate transactions can be approved with the explicit
permission of an authoritative figure within the government; and “with-
out authority”may not alone adequately distinguish acceptable activity
from wrongful activity. When applied to the embezzlement element, the
bona fide salary exception clarifies that a transaction conducted with
authority is one that is a bona fide commercial transaction. Likewise, a
119 United States v. Chafin, 808 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2015).
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“rightful owner” under the statute, is the recipient of a bona fide trans-
action in the usual course of business.
It could also be contended that the argument for reading the bona
fide salary exception in parallel with the bona fide salary exception of
the bank bribery statute cautions against application to the embezzle-
ment element. No such element is found in the bank bribery statute,
and the legislative history could therefore be read to not apply to the
embezzlement element––just like it was not intended to apply to the
transactional or federal funds element. But the bribery and embezzle-
ment elements perform the same role within the statute: the elements
identify the wrongful act that defines the respective crime. Application
of the bona fide salary exception therefore affects the embezzlement el-
ement in the same way that it affects the bribery element: the exception
narrows the scope of a broad category in order to distinguish acceptable
action—where the integrity of federal funds is maintained—from a
wrongful action. There is no such comparable effect with respect to the
transaction or federal funds elements, which define the implications of
a wrongdoing rather than the wrongdoing itself.
D. The Transactional Element
In enacting the federal funds bribery statute, Congress made a de-
cision to not involve federal law enforcement resources in every in-
stance of state and local corruption. Instead, Congress wrote the statute
to apply only to instances where the integrity of federal funds is suffi-
ciently threatened and the wrongdoing is severe enough that federal
government attention is both warranted and worthwhile.
A bribe is an economic transaction. The person that gives the bribe
(the briber) pays some cost to the person that receives the bribe. The
cost is considered worthwhile for the briber because achieving the de-
sired outcome in the transaction he or she seeks to influence is more
valuable than the cost that he or she pays. The transactional element
seeks to establish the value of this desired outcome and set a threshold
for outcomes that are large enough to warrant federal intervention and
expenditure of limited federal resources. As such, the transactional el-
ement creates two categories of benefits to the briber: (1) benefits re-
sulting from transactions that are worth less than $5,000; and (2) ben-
efits resulting from transactions that are worth $5,000 or more. This
separation is coherently included in the statute, because it measures
the government’s interest in getting involved with conduct severe
enough to merit federal attention.
Applying the bona fide salary exception to the transactional ele-
ment would further divide benefits valued at $5,000 or more into two
subcategories: bribes meant to influence compensation of $5,000 or
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more paid in the usual course of business, and bribes meant to influence
other transactions of $5,000 or more. Unlike the distinction between
benefits less than $5,000 and benefits greater than $5,000, this further
distinction does not advance the federal government’s interest in involv-
ing federal resources only in cases that are sufficiently severe. The ap-
plication of the bona fide salary exception to the transactional element
thus leads to an underinclusive effect that is inconsistent with the pur-
pose of the statute.
Consider two scenarios as an example. In the first scenario, a drug
dealer pays a police officer $1,000 in exchange for the police officer leav-
ing his drug business alone––a business that the dealer values at
$6,000. In this scenario, the bribe is “anything of value” and in connec-
tion with a business “involving anything of value of $5,000 or more”;
but, the transactional element is not compensation in the usual course
of business. In the second scenario, an owner of a construction company
pays a public works department official $1,000 in exchange for the de-
partment hiring the owner’s company to build the new city hall––a pro-
ject valued at $6,000. The bribe is also “anything of value” and in con-
nection with a business “involving anything of value of $5,000 or more,”
but the transactional element is compensation in the usual course of
business.120 If the bona fide salary exception applied to the transac-
tional element, the second scenario would not fall under the scope of the
federal funds bribery statute. The beneficial outcome for the briber is
the same regardless of whether the outcome is a $6,000 commercial
transaction in the usual course of business. Because of this, a briber
would be willing to pay the same cost to achieve either outcome. Both
transactions are clearly a bribe, and the severity of wrongdoing in terms
of the misuse of federal funds is the same in each instance.121 A distinc-
tion between these two transactions would not advance the federal gov-
ernment’s interest in protecting the integrity of federal funds, which is
the primary purpose and constitutional justification for the statute.
This arbitrary distinction does not appear when the bona fide sal-
ary exception is applied to the bribery and embezzlement elements. The
bribery element need only be “anything of value,” and thus, the only
120 One could argue that the payment of a bribe in this scenario renders the transaction outside
of the “usual course of business.” But this argument conflates the bribery and transactional ele-
ments, which are clearly distinguished as separate elements in the statute. Further, if the bona
fide salary exception was read to apply to the transactional element, but every transaction con-
nected to a bribe was not conducted in the usual course of business, the exception would never
have any applicability.
121 It is true that the severity of wrongdoing of the underlying activities in the scenarios is not
equal under the law, given that one of the scenarios considers illegal activity, while the other con-
siders legal activity. But the severity of the underlying activity is the subject of other criminal
statutes. The wrongdoing sought to be remedied by the federal funds bribery statute is the wrong-
doing associated with the corrupt transfer of money in order to bring about an outcome.
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distinction is between legitimate and illegitimate transactions. The em-
bezzlement element must be $5,000 or more, meaning there is a class
of illegitimate transactions that the statute does not cover. But this sub-
distinction, between illegitimate transactions valued at less than
$5,000 and illegitimate transactions valued at $5,000 or more, furthers
the federal government’s interest in only pursuing cases that are suffi-
ciently severe.
For these reasons, the bona fide salary exception should not be read
to apply to the transactional element.
E. The Federal Funds Element
The statutory text that surrounds the federal funds element ini-
tially narrows the scope of possible federal payments. The use of the
phrase “or other form of Federal assistance” implies that each of the
enumerated examples of benefits—grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guar-
antee, and insurance—must constitute some form of federal assistance.
The ordinary meaning of “federal assistance” does not include transac-
tions such as hiring or commercial purchases, where the federal govern-
ment receives a direct good or service benefit. The legislative history
supports this concept. A Senate report122 noted:
The term “federal program” means that there must exist a spe-
cific statutory scheme authorizing the federal assistance in order
to promote or achieve certain policy objectives. Thus, not every
federal contract or disbursement of funds would be covered. For
example, if a government agency lawfully purchases more than
$10,000 in equipment from a supplier, it is not the intent of this
section to make a theft of $5,000 or more from the supplier of a
federal crime.123
Because this committee report was written for the original version
of the federal funds bribery statute before the bona fide salary exception
was added to the statute, it reinforces the idea that this narrowing of
“federal assistance” occurs without any consideration of the exception.
In Fischer, the Supreme Court noted that “[a]ny receipt of federal
funds can, at some level of generality, be characterized as a benefit,”
but “the statute does not employ this broad, almost limitless use of the
122 S. REP. NO. 98–225, at 369 (1983). This committee report was written for the original ver-
sion of the federal funds bribery statute, before the bona fide salary exception was added to the
statute.
123 Id.
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term.”124 The Court further stated “[t]o determine whether an organi-
zation participating in a federal assistance program receives ‘benefits,’
an examination must be undertaken of the program’s structure, opera-
tion, and purpose.”125 The Court’s commentary indicates that “federal
assistance” refers to federal statutory funding programs.
Reading the bona fide salary exception to apply to the federal funds
element therefore could be consistent with one of two interpretations,
both of which should be rejected.
The first interpretation is that the bona fide salary exception is
merely meant to make the same distinction that the use of “federal as-
sistance” does: to ensure that the federal funds element is only met by
looking at payments to covered entities through statutory funding
schemes, as opposed to commercial transactions between the federal
government and covered entities. This reading would apply the bona
fide salary exception to the federal funds element, but it would make
the exception superfluous.
The second interpretation is that the bona fide salary exception cre-
ates a distinction, not in the form of payment from the federal govern-
ment, but in how the federal funds are spent by a covered entity. Ac-
cording to this reading, it would not count toward the federal funds
requirement when a covered entity uses the proceeds of federal funding
in the usual course of business (hiring employees, purchasing goods and
services, etc.), but it would count toward the requirement when federal
funds are used for any other purpose. Given that expenses in the usual
course of business make up a large portion of government spending, this
reading would dramatically reduce the applicability of the statute. And
much like the arbitrary distinction made if the bona fide salary excep-
tion was applied to the transactional element, this distinction does not
further any governmental interest. The manner in which entities spend
federal funds does not have a relation to the severity of wrongdoing.
And the integrity of federal funds is equally threatened when these
funds are sent to corrupt governmental actors, regardless of what these
actors later spend these specific funds on.
Finally, this inquiry into how federal fund recipients spend these
funds contradicts how the statute has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court. In Salinas v. United States,126 the Court held that the statute
“does not require the Government to prove the bribe in question had
any particular influence on federal funds.”127 Reading the bona fide sal-
124 Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 681 (2000).
125 Id. at 680.
126 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
127 Id. at 61.
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ary exception to distinguish between how covered entities make ex-
penses that are unrelated to the wrongdoing requires the Government
to establish exactly the kind of evidence that was held to be unnecessary
in Salinas. Covered entity expenditures that are affected by the bribe
are already accounted for by the transactional element.
For these reasons, the bona fide salary exception should not be read
to apply to the federal funds element.
F. Policy Implications
As noted previously, the number of transactions involving govern-
ment agents or resources that are subject to criminal liability under the
federal funds bribery statute decreases as the number of requirements
subject to the bona fide salary exception increases. This decrease only
hinders the federal government’s ability to effectively limit corruption
if the transactions excluded from the scope of the statute are corrupt
transactions, which threaten the integrity of federal funds and are of
sufficient severity to merit federal attention.
With respect to the bribery and embezzlement elements, the inter-
pretation put forward in this Comment reads the bona fide salary ex-
ception as a way to separate legitimate commercial transactions from
corrupt bribery and embezzlement. This distinction excludes certain
transactions from the scope of the statute, but it does so for the reason
that these excluded transactions are ordinary transactions in the course
of performing the responsibilities of governmental entities. These trans-
actions further legitimate governmental objectives, act in the public’s
interest rather than sowing public distrust, and do not misuse resources
and agents that are in part funded by the federal government. The fed-
eral government’s ability to effectively limit corruption in federally
funded entities is in no way hindered when the bona fide salary excep-
tion is applied to the bribery and embezzlement elements.
But the interpretation put forth in this Comment does not apply
the bona fide salary exception to the transactional and federal funds
elements, because this distinction would create a class of corrupt trans-
actions that are outside the scope of statute. This distinction does limit
the federal government’s ability to effectively limit corruption in feder-
ally funded entities, and does so without contributing to the govern-
ment’s interest in protecting the integrity of federal funds or the gov-
ernment’s interest in only expending federal resources on instances of
corruption that are sufficiently severe. In other words, the application
of the bona fide salary exception to the transactional and federal funds
elements would limit the federal government’s ability to prosecute state
and local corruption, but this limitation would be unrelated to the policy
objectives of the statute.
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One could argue that because the scope of federal involvement in
state and local matters has increased too much under the federal funds
bribery statute, this involvement should be curbed through a more ag-
gressive application of the bona fide salary exception than this Com-
ment proposes. But an application of the bona fide salary exception,
without respect to the policy goals of the statute, would argue for limi-
tation for the sake of limitation without considering why it is desirable
for the federal government to be involved at some level in matters of
state and local government. Leaving the responsibility for preventing
state corruption to the state itself could severely inhibit the ability to
solve the matter in furtherance of public interest, particularly when
those tasked with enforcement are the very subject of the corruption.
State agents are constantly interacting with one another, and providing
corruption enforcement discretion could merely add one more interac-
tion to this system, thus leaving open the possibility that the benefits
of strict enforcement will be weighed in context with other internal ob-
jectives. It is reasonable to expect that, for example, state law enforce-
ment would be hesitant to prosecute corruption against a state legisla-
tor if that legislator also had broad authority over the state law
enforcement budget. Giving this corruption prevention authority to
state actors could thus be used as a bargaining chip to be utilized in
furthering corrupt transactions. The federal funds bribery statute pro-
vides a tool to remove this enforcement power from the state and place
it in the hands of a higher body of government, that is less dependent
on the decisions of state agents. Given these consequences, the bona
fide salary exception should only be used to limit federal involvement
in matters of state and local corruption when such limitation distin-
guishes acceptable from wrongful activity, and furthers the policy ob-
jectives of the statute.
V. CONCLUSION
The valuation requirements in the federal funds bribery statute fit
into two general categories. The bribery and embezzlement elements
determine whether a wrongdoing has occurred, while the transactional
and federal funds elements describe the circumstances surrounding the
wrongdoing and the federal government’s interest in the wrongdoing.
This Comment proposes that the bona fide salary exception applies to
the embezzlement element and the bribery element, but not to the
transactional element or the federal funds element. This is because the
categories of expenses enumerated in the exception relate to the type of
transaction that has occurred, but they do not bear any relation to the
severity of the wrongdoing or the federal government’s interest in the
wrongdoing. Application of the bona fide salary exception to the former
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elements distinguishes transactions that are consistent with legitimate
governmental objectives, from transactions that are contradictory to
governmental objectives and the public interest. Application of the bona
fide salary exception to the latter elements, however, would create ar-
bitrary classes of corrupt transactions without furthering a federal in-
terest expressed in the statute.
The federal funds bribery statute draws three lines that determine
the scope of criminal liability. The statute distinguishes between (1)
transactions for legitimate government purposes and transactions for
illegitimate purposes, (2) transactions of sufficient severity to merit the
attention of the federal government and transactions of insufficient se-
verity to do so, and (3) transactions that threaten the integrity of federal
funds and transactions that do not threaten the integrity of federal
funds. Applying the bona fide salary exception to the bribery and em-
bezzlement elements, but not to the transactional and federal funds el-
ements, is the best way to respect these statutory lines drawn by Con-
gress and further the policy objectives associated with them.
